Intellectual Property Brief
Volume 2
Issue 1 Summer 2010

Article 3

1-1-2010

LOGORAMA: The Great Trademark Heist
Rose Lawrence

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
Recommended Citation
Lawrence, Rose “LOGORAMA: The Great Trademark Heist.” American University Intellectual Property Brief, Summer 2010, 4-9.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Intellectual Property Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

LOGORAMA: The Great Trademark Heist
Keywords

Trademark, LOGORAMA, Lanham act, 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act

This article is available in Intellectual Property Brief: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol2/iss1/3

LOGORAMA: The Great Trademark Heist
By Rose Lawrence

I

n 2010 the Academy Award for Best Animated
Short Film went to LOGORAMA, a 16-minute
film by French collective H5. H5 used over 3,000
trademarked logos and mascots without permission
as backgrounds, plots and characters. A Los Angeles
is created from logos serving as buildings, street signs,
vehicles and nature. The inhabitants
include AOL messengers, Pringles
men, and Michelin men. Ronald
McDonald is the villain, who
kills a foul-mouthed Haribo boy
and takes the Big Boy burger boy
hostage. The Esso Girl is the heroine
who escapes the X-Box earthquake
causing California to sink into the
ocean until the new state outlines are a Nike Swoosh.
LOGORAMA is a spectacular movie, but many
question whether it is legal under the Lanham Act and
the 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act. Since their
trademarks were utilized without permission, all of the
depicted trademark owners would seem to have claims
for infringement and - given the crude and violent
nature of the film - claims of dilution by tarnishment
as well. However, recent legislative interpretation
and judicial proceedings appear to indicate that
LOGORAMA is a commercial use eligible for the noncommercial use exception under the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act and protected free speech as parody under
the First Amendment.1
To constitute infringement, a mark must be used
in commerce and likely to confuse consumers as to the
product or service’s origin.2 Claims for infringement
would be available to every mark in LOGORAMA that
was in place of a tree, building, character, geography,
vehicle, etc. For example, in Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt
Disney Co., Caterpillar sought to enjoin the release of
Disney’s “George of the Jungle 2” movie because the
exact Caterpillar trademark was depicted on Caterpillar
bulldozers used throughout the movie.3 The Central
1. This paper is restricted to the United States treatment of Trademarks, state and federal cases are referenced for support.
2. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 22 (2006).
3. Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913, 919-
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District for Illinois court resisted applying a likelihood
of confusion test to Caterpillar’s claim, but nonetheless
briefly went through the factors.4 The court did
not recognize the presence of competing trademarks
because the trademarks depicted were the authentic
trademark and not confusingly similar trademarks.5
Likewise the court saw no competition
between Caterpillar and “George of
the Jungle 2” videos and DVD sales.6
The court did note Disney’s bad intent
in the unauthorized use of Caterpillar
trademarks, but found it unconvincing as
the Caterpillar trademark was not used to
drive sales or derive consumer awareness
of “George of the Jungle” videos and
DVDs.7
Additionally, the court did not see any evidence
that in using the Caterpillar trademark Disney was
attempting to “poach or free-ride on the fame and
goodwill of Caterpillar’s trademarks.”8 In essence,
Caterpillar’s claims rested heavily on the mere presence
of its trademarks in the movie, and the court responded
by pointing to a long history of products “bearing
well known trademarks” incorporated into movies and
television.9 The court held that the mere presence was
not enough for claims of infringement or dilution in
“George of the Jungle 2.”10 This judicial decision echoes
others for the principle that permission is not needed
for the use of brand names in fiction as long as the
trademark refers specifically to the trademark owner and
there is no confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement.
The same logic seems applicable to
LOGORAMA. Most of the marks used in the film
are merely present in the film and representative of
nothing more than themselves. There is no presence
921 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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of competing marks - the marks used were specifically
chosen because they were recognizable national brands
that reference themselves and no other product.11 Like
in Caterpillar, it cannot be said that the LOGORAMA
film competes with or substitutes the market for the
logos depicted in the film, whose products range from
oil, fast food, toothpaste, financial services, etc. It is
unlikely that the public would think these trademark
owners have branched into the film industry, much
less as a collective. The sheer abundance of trademarks
utilized also weighs against consumer confusion. It is
hard to imagine that a reasonable person would watch
LOGORAMA and believe that 3,000 trademark owners
had functioned together to sponsor the film. Audiences
are accustomed to seeing trademarks in movies, and
do not tend to assume from their presence that the
trademarks depicted represent an endorsement or other
indication of origin. Rather, the marks are accepted as
part of the visual vocabulary of the real world.
Similar to Caterpillar, there is a possible
argument for H5’s bad faith in using the 3,000 marks
without permission. In Caterpillar, the court focused
on whether the mark was used to drive sales of the film,
and found that it was not.12 LOGORAMA is unique
in using nothing but logos, leading critics to question
whether it would have garnered the same attention
without the logos. The use of the logos certainly called
the film to the public’s initial attention; however, it was
the expressive, and not commercial, use of these marks
that was the heart of the film. LOGORAMA was first
available, and remains, free online - its commercial
success can be attributed to winning the 2010 Academy
Award rather than the mere use of the marks.13 Even if a
trademark owner were to argue that the expression of the
marks contributed to LOGORAMA sales, the Northern
District of California court in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media
Mkt. Group, Ltd. commented “expressive use of a mark
is not rendered commercial by the impact of the use on
sales.”14
11. Nominative fair use is not discussed in this paper, as the main
elements of the doctrine concern protection for using one brand to
reference or distinguish another in a descriptive sense. Here there
are no competing brands so nominative fair use is inapplicable,
other then a stretched argument that LOGORAMA does not use
the brands more then is necessary than to describe the world it creates.
12. Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913, 919921 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
13. LOGORAMA can be viewed free of charge at UsefulArts.us,
http://usefularts.us/2010/04/24/watch-logorama-trademarks/.
14. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d
897, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

If Caterpillar is controlling, then the additional
claim of dilution by tarnishment against LOGORAMA
is more compelling. Dilution does not require a
likelihood of confusion.15 Dilution by tarnishment
does require that a mark harm the reputation of a
famous mark.16 This happens when the mark is cast in
an unflattering light, typically through its association
with inferior or unseemly products or services.17 The
trademark’s reputation and commercial value could
be harmed “because the public will associate the lack
of quality or the lack of prestige in the defendant’s
goods with the plaintiff’s unrelated goods, or because
the defendant’s use reduces the trademark’s reputation
and standing in the eyes of consumers as a wholesome
identifier of the owner’s products or services.”18 Finally,
dilution by tarnishment is a claim only available
to famous marks.19 Through the eight factors, the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act effectively restricts
“famous” to nationally recognized brands.20 In
LOGORAMA, the characters that dominate the plot
are Ronald McDonald, the Esso Girl, Big Boy, Haribo,
Michelin, Pringles, and, to a lesser extent, Green Giant
and Mr. Clean. All these marks are representative of
national brands and are therefore arguably “famous.”
In LOGORAMA it is these famous marks that make
up the lead characters, responsible for the cursing, sex,
and extreme violence that drive the plot. However,
the remaining national brands used as buildings,
geography, vehicles, and street signs may be eligible
for consideration under the requirement of harm to
reputation due to their inclusion in the film that features
hyper language, sex, and violence. H5 specifically
chose 3,000 famous national brands for use because
they wanted them to be widely recognized by the
public. However, on this claim LOGORAMA can be
argued to be a protected free speech parody under the
non-commercial exception of the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act.
The key factor in finding a non-commercial
use exception under dilution by tarnishment is that an
offending mark must be tied to a product or service and
15. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125 (2006)
16. Id.
17. ToysRUs was successful in bringing a tarnishment claim
against adultsrus.com, a pornographic web-site selling adult entertainment toys and video. Toys “R” Us v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
18. Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2nd Cir.
1994).
19. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C 1125(c)
(2006).
20. Id.
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used in commerce. 21 In Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records
Inc., the “Barbie Girl” case, the Ninth Circuit court
commented on the “noncommercial use” exception
to the Anti-Dilution Act.22 Mattel brought suit for
infringement and dilution by tarnishment against MCA
Records for the single “Barbie Girl” by Aqua wherein
Barbie was enticed to “go party.”23 The court found the
song to be a “commercial use in commerce,” because
the song and the album used the mark and were sold
to the public.24 However, it also found “Barbie Girl”
to be eligible for the non-commercial use exception,
stating a “use in commerce” does not preclude a “noncommercial use” exception.25 Deciding whether speech
is commercial or non-commercial brings the First
Amendment into the fight.
Previously in Hoffman v. Capitol Cities/ABC Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit court delineated between commercial
and noncommercial speech.26 In Hoffman, a magazine
printed unauthorized altered images of Dustin Hoffman
and others. Hoffman sued for the unauthorized use of
the Tootsie image. The court held that “the ‘core notion
of commercial speech’ is that it ‘does no more than
propose a commercial transaction.’”27 The court found
that if speech is not “purely commercial,” meaning it
does more than a mere commercial transaction, than it is
not infringing for trademark purposes but entitled to full
protection under the First Amendment.28 Specifically,
it held that regardless of the commercial nature, the
magazine ad was protected because of “humor” and
“visual and verbal editorial comment.”29 The fact that
commercial elements were “inextricably entwined with
[these] expressive elements,” lent it protection against
trademark infringement and dilution.30 Mattel also
applied this standard and found “Barbie Girl” by Aqua
to likewise not be purely commercial speech because it
21. “Dilution” refers to the “whittling away of the value of a trademark” when it’s used to identify different products. J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24.67, at
24-180; § 24.70 (2001).
22. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
23. Id at 900.
24. Id at 904.
25. Id at 906., citing Jerome Gilson et al., Trademark Protection
and Practice § 5.12[1][c][vi], at 5-240.
26. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir.
2001).
27. Id. at 1184 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60 (1983)).
28. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th
Cir. 2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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expressed Aqua’s view of Barbie.31
LOGORAMA does not use any of the 3,000
marks in connection to a product or service other
then those of the trademarks themselves. Rather,
LOGORAMA utilizes the 3,000 marks to create a world
of contemporary visual vocabulary. The marks are
innovatively used for commentary on themselves as well
as in relationship to each other. Similar to Hoffman, the
commercial value of the LOGORAMA is inextricably
entwined with expressive elements, and therefore the
entirety should be protected under the First Amendment
by its’ “visual and verbal editorial comment.”32 Thus,
under Mattel and Hoffman, it would be difficult to
cast LOGORAMA as “purely commercial” speech.
LOGORAMA therefore should be eligible for the noncommercial speech exception to the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act and protected under the First Amendment.
Specifically, LOGORAMA should be protected as a
parody.
In Mattel, the “Barbie Girl” song was found
to be a parody that ridicules the image and cultural
values Barbie supposedly represents.33 Mattel points
out further legislative history to support that parody
- satire; editorial and other forms of expression were
specifically not part of a commercial transaction in the
purposing of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.34
Mattel referenced a previous ruling in LL Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc. affirming the parody protection.35
LL Bean sought to enjoin the release of the magazine’s
article “L.L. Beam’s Back-To-School-Sex-Catalogue,”
which depicted a mark similar to L.L. Bean’s and
showed nude models using products in sexually explicit
positions.36 The First Circuit court held this to be a
parody, noting that if the anti-dilution statute allowed
trademark owners to enjoin an unauthorized use of its’
31. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
32. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th
Cir. 2001).
33. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
34. The proposed law “will not prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of
expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction.” Mattel,
Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S19306-10, S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 Cong. Rec. H14317-01, H14318
(daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead)).
35. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
36. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.
1987).
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trademark from being used in noncommercial contexts
that were negative or offensive then “a corporation could
shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its
name in commentaries critical of its conduct.”37 The
First Circuit cited noncommercial settings to include
editorial or artistic context communicating ideas or
expressing points of view.38 Furthermore, the court
referenced a previous decision in which it held that
neither the strictures of the First Amendment, nor the
history and theory of anti-dilution law permit a finding
of tarnishment based solely on the presence of an
unwholesome or negative context in which a trademark
is used without authorization.39 LOGORAMA depicts
the majority of its unauthorized famous marks in an
unwholesome context, such as Ronald McDonald killing
the Haribo Boy and taking Big Boy hostage, an upthe-skirt view of the Green Giant, and an extroverted
homosexual Mr. Clean zoo guide. L.L. Bean and Mattel
would indicate that though perhaps unwholesome and
negative, these depictions alone are not actionable.
The crux of such protected expression is a parody
that requires the target of the parody to be the mark
itself and not the use of the mark to make a broader
statement. In Rogers v. Koons, a copyright case, artist
Jeff Koons made a sculpture from a photograph by Art
Rogers.40 The Second Circuit found Koons’ parody fair
use defense unconvincing.41 The court held that the
copyrighted work is required to be at least in part the
target of the defendant’s satire to be legally considered a
“parody.”42 However, the court also said that the “satire
need not be only of the copied work and may . . . also
be a parody of modern society” but it was critical the
original work still be a target as well.43 The purpose
of this requirement was the court’s insistence that “the
audience be aware that underlying the parody there
is an original and separate expression, attributable to
a different artist.”44 The court did not find parody or
37. Trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or
expressing points of view. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,
Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High
Frontier, 662 F. Supp. 931 (D.C. 1985)).
38. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31-34
(1st Cir. 1987).
39. Id.
40. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d at 185 (2d. Cir. 1981); 3 Nimmer, §
13.05[C] n. 60.9).
44. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).

sufficient satire, as the commentary of the banality of
society Koons was after could have been achieved by
other means and was not tied to the Rogers work for
expression.45
The copyright understanding of parody and
satire is analogous in trademark law, as the court in
Mattel relied on this in deciding that the “Barbie Girl”
expression was protected as a parody.46 While targeting
Barbie specifically, the song had a broader message as
well due to Barbie’s status as a cultural icon in society.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit court in Dr. Seuss Ents.,
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., did not find parody
where the defendants used the writing style of Dr. Seuss
and the trademark striped stovepipe hat on the front
and back cover in a retelling of the O.J. Simpson trial.47
Neither Dr. Seuss nor the trademarked Cat in the Hat
were the targets of the parody, rather they were used
to comment on the O.J. Simpson trial.48 The court
held that in situations where the artistic work targets
an original work and does not use it merely to garner
attention, the First Amendment has greater weight in
the balancing test of trademark interests and protected
speech.49
LOGORAMA targets the marks themselves
in creating an elaborate parody for artistic expression.
Ronald McDonald, a wholesome mark representing
McDonald’s, is primarily used to engage children
in the consumption of McDonald’s fast food. In
LOGORAMA, Ronald kills a child and threatens
another before escaping on a Grease 2 motorcycle and
crashing into a giant Weightwatchers truck. Similar to
Mattel where Aqua targeted the cultural values associated
with the Barbie Icon, LOGORAMA here targeted the
cultural values associated with McDonald’s icon, Ronald
McDonald. Both placed trademarked icons in hyper
realities of sex or violence to parody their traditional
values. During the X-Box earthquake, the corporate
symbols initially shown as pillars in the society are seen
crashing to the earth- including the Enron, K-Mart,
and Freddie Mac corporations that have been involved
in recent and very public scandals. Likewise, logos
seen drowning in oil include Phillips 66, Chrysler,
and the “W” from the George W. Bush reelection
45. Id.
46. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002).
47. Dr. Seuss Ents., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394
(9th Cir. 1997).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1408.
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campaign of 2004 - all logos connected strongly to oil
production. While not all of the marks achieve the
same level of parody, as already discussed in Caterpillar,
mere presence is not actionable. Additionally, those
logos that don’t have as strong of a claim to parody
are not used “merely to garner attention” which was
the concern in Dr. Seuss. The use of every mark lends
to the greater message of the film. One such instance
occurs near the end of the film as an IBM building is
seen collapsing. As it falls to the ground its slogan loses
an “s” to read “Solutions for a mall planet.” The larger
parody is of a hyper consumption of the developed
world and the overwhelming presence of brands in the
public consciousness.50 However, it is important to note
that this broader parody is a natural result of parodying
multiple brands at once and is not an independent
critique that could have been made without the use of
marks. Thus, LOGORAMA would seem to fit nicely
into the Koons’ court’s consideration of copyright, in that
a parody can be a parody of modern society as long as
the original work is still targeted.51
This difference is important to note because the
line between parody and satire is a hotly debated topic
since Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.52 There, the
Supreme Court differentiated between a parody that
targets and mimics the original work to make its point
and a satire that uses the work to criticize something
else, therefore requiring justification for the very act of
borrowing.53 The Court specifically avoided creating a
bright line rule regarding parody and satire in Campbell,
pointing out the often hybrid nature of parody
and satire.54 Campbell merely states that the more
attenuated the parody, the stronger the scrutiny and that
“looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as
may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than
would otherwise be required.”55 Recent developments
support the specific protection of unauthorized use
trademarks in satire based on their intrinsic expressive
value in society.
50. Esteban Del Rio, FlowTV, Logorama’s Chaotic Critique of Corporate Rule, Mar. 26 2010 available at http://flowtv.org/?p=4857. It
is important to note this article uses parody and satire interchangeably, and does not use them in a legal sense.
51. “Though the satire need not be only of the copied work and
may . . . also be a parody of modern society, the copied work must
be, at least in part, an object of the parody.” Rogers v. Koons, 960
F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
52. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 US 569 (1994).
53. Id. at 582.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Judge Kozinski, who wrote the majority opinion
in Mattel, noted in his 1993 speech “Trademarks
Unplugged” that “when trademark owners put their
mark to the public in well-orchestrated campaigns
intended to burn them into our collective consciousness,
the owners must then relinquish control over the
trademark as a consequence of seeking such exposure
because the mark has taken on symbolic meaning as part
of society at large.”56 After a trademark has become part
of the public discourse, the paramount concern in any
balancing test must be the public’s right to make use
of the mark.57 Further judicial proceedings have noted
trademarks’ unique expressive capacity as well.
In Yankee Publishing, Inc., v. News American
Publishing, Inc., the Southern District of New York court
noted that many trademarks assume expressive value due
to their prominence in culture.58 “When unauthorized
use of another’s mark is part of a communicative message
and not a source identifier, the First Amendment is
implicated in opposition to the trademark right.”59 In
Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit court held that
“in general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to
apply to artistic works only where the public interest
in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression.”60 Famous marks have
particularly strong powers of expression, especially if
they are cultural icons.61 Their fame has integrated the
marks into daily life as well as public vocabulary; the use
of the trademark is the most efficient way to reference
it.62 The emerging arguments concerning trademarks’
unique expressive power in the public consciousness
would seem to strengthen the argument for satire. In
a world populated by brands, it becomes necessary to
include marks, whether the subject of parody or satire,
for the expression to be successfully understood. The
Mattel court seems to agree, stating, “Trademarks often
fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary
flavor to our expressions.”63 Thus, if LOGORAMA were
56. Alex Kozinski, Judge, United States Trademarks Unplugged, 68
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 976 (1993).
57. Id.
58. Yankee Publ’g, Inc., v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc, 809 F.Supp. 267,
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
59. Id.
60. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989).
61. Steven Cordero, Cocaine-Cola, The Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending the Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 8
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 599 (1998).
62. Robert Denicola, Trademarks As Speech, 1982 Wis.L.Rev. 158
(1982).
63. Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.
2002).
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to be considered satire rather than parody, it is possible
it would still be protected. It is hard to talk about
brands and consumption without using the brands that
are nationally known. As a result of the film utilizing
so many marks, LOGORAMA naturally assumes a
secondary meaning beyond the marks.
Further support for a finding of non-commercial
exception of parody in LOGORAMA is illustrated in
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC,
where Tommy Hilfiger sought to enjoin an animal
perfume entitled Timmy Holedigger. The court for
the Southern District of New York reasoned that the
strength of the mark subject to parody might make it
easier for an audience to recognize the use as a parody.64
The marks used in LOGORAMA are nationally
recognized brands whose reputation is well established,
their depiction in the film is in total opposition to
their established reputation. This extreme contrast
should assist in a finding of parody. The concern in
the copyright Koons case was that the audience must be
aware that there is an original and separate expression
attributable to a different artist.65 In the hands of
H5, the marks in LOGORAMA become something
other and extremely different than what they were and
it is understood these new marks are their creation,
independent of the originals. Additionally, in deciding
trademark dilution in Caterpillar, the court emphasized
the “cartoon” nature of the film through its borrowing of
motifs from animated films such as “belated recognition
close-ups, collisions so bone-jarring that George’s
outline is left embedded into a tree and other such well
established cartoon clichés that clearly establish the
fantastic nature of the movie.”66 This fantastic nature
lends to the idea that the public would not see the
Caterpillar trademark used in the movie as an association
that would harm the reputation of the trademark
owner.67 LOGORAMA is an animated film, involving
similar motifs of the cartoon genre that, like Caterpillar,
establish the fantastic nature of the film. Despite the
extreme nature of the actions of many characters,
the cartoon world should be sufficient for a court to
find that the public would not see the associations in
LOGORAMA to harm the marks depicted.
Judicial precedent seems to indicate that those
64. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC., 221 F.
Supp 2d 410, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
65. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992).
66. Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913, 923
(C.D. Ill. 2003).
67. Id.

trademark owners who would bring claims of trademark
infringement and dilution by tarnishment against
LOGORAMA are unlikely to be successful. Factors that
would normally be considered in a straight trademark
infringement likelihood of confusion analysis are
lacking. Most notably, there is an absence of competing
goods, as the marks represent themselves in the film
and the film cannot be considered in competition with
them based on the reasoning in Caterpillar.68 Also based
on the sheer abundance of trademarks used, there is no
likelihood of consumer confusion as to endorsement,
sponsorship, or other indication of ownership. In
terms of dilution, artistic expression has been found
to be outside the scope of the anti-dilution statute’s
protection of unauthorized use of trademarks in the
marketing of “incompatible products or services.”69
LOGORAMA is thus a daring example of the noncommercial use exception to the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act and protected speech as parody under
the First Amendment. It is unlikely, however, that the
courts will have a chance to decide on this issue. Since
winning the 2010 Academy Awards, LOGORAMA has
garnered international attention and goodwill. It would
be poor policy on behalf of the trademark owners to file
suit. In fact, in the aftermath of the Oscars, it appears
some trademark owners seem happy to have been
recognized as “famous” enough to be included and have
expressed no interest in pursuing trademark violation
claims.70 As a tongue-in-cheek response to the whole
trademark question, H5 producer Nicolas Schmerkin
in his acceptance speech thanked the 3,000 non-official
sponsors that appear in the film and assured them that
no logos were harmed in the making of LOGORAMA.71

68. Caterpillar Inc., v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d. 913
(C.D. Ill. 2003).
69. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 1987).
70. Cash Converter, a depicted trademark, thanked H5 for including it in the film. Esteban Del Rio, Logorama’s Chaotic Critique
of Corporate Rule, FlowTV, Mar. 26 2010 available at http://flowtv.
org/?p=4857.
71. Id.
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